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A Dilemma for the Weak Deflationist about Truth 
 
1 Introduction 
 
The deflationist about truth is committed to a triviality or transparency thesis: the 
content of the truth predicate is exhausted by its involvement in some version of 
the truth-schema [P] is true iff P (where ‘[P]’ stands for any declarative 
propositional object and ‘P’ stands for ‘[P]’s object-level equivalent). Within this 
classification, deflationists can usefully be divided into two camps according to 
the extent of their ontological commitment: a strong camp and a weak camp. 
Strong deflationism holds that the truth predicate doesn’t designate a property or 
that there is no property of truth (e.g., Ramsey (1927), Ayer (1946), and Grover, 
Camp and Belnap (1975)). Weak deflationism holds that the truth predicate does 
designate a property (e.g., Horwich (1998a, 1999), Sosa (1993) and Soames 
(1997, 1999)). It is just that the property of truth, on weak deflationism, is 
deflated in some sense, e.g., it is not substantial, theoretically important, 
interesting, explanatory, a natural kind, or anything in this general vicinity. For 
example, Horwich, in making the latter kind of claim, denies that truth is “an 
ordinary sort of property ― a characteristic whose underlying nature will account 
for its relations to other ingredients of reality” (1998a, p. 2).  
As things currently stand, the consensus is that weak deflationism is the 
superior deflationary alternative. The problem with strong deflationism is that its 
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ontological thesis  that truth is not a property  seems to be underwritten by a 
semantic claim that is widely regarded as indefensible: ‘is true’ does not function 
semantically as a predicate (i.e., it does not denote a property). Among others, 
Horwich (1998a, p.3) and Gupta (1993, pp. 366-7) have persuasively argued the 
speciousness of this thesis on the grounds that ‘[P] is true’ and ‘P’ are not 
synonymous,1 implying that ‘is true’ is ineliminable, and correspondingly, that it 
must designate a property of some sort.2   
 In opposition to the prevailing view, I argue here that weak deflationism’s 
initial promise is illusory, that it falls short of being a viable alternative to strong 
deflationism and to inflationary theories of truth (theories according to which 
truth is a substantial property of truth bearers). Weak deflationism, it turns out, is 
on shaky ground since it is vulnerable to an inexorable instability objection the 
general form of which has been highlighted by Boghossian (1990) and Wright 
(1992, 1996). Contra Boghossian and Wright, though, it turns out that the 
strongest variation of the instability objection gives rise to a dilemma concerning 
truth-property ascriptions rather than the concept of truth. 
 
                                                          
 
1 Gupta appeals primarily to the indispensable generalizing function of the truth predicate to 
undermine the synonymy claim. Horwich appeals to the denominalizing function of the truth 
predicate in general to undermine the synonymy claim.  
 
2 See Horwich (1998a) for the general line of argument thought to undermine strong 
deflationism’s ontological thesis: “… ‘is true’ is a perfectly good English predicate – and (leaving 
aside nominalistic concerns about the very notion of ‘property’) one might well take this to be a 
conclusive criterion of standing for a property of some sort” (p. 37); “No doubt truth is very 
different from most properties insofar as it has no underlying nature; but in light of the inferential 
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2 The Dilemma 
 
Weak deflationism (hereafter ‘WD’), unlike strong deflationism, is a theory of 
truth that takes the ontological middle road. It is committed to a two-pronged 
ontological thesis: truth is both i) a property and ii) deflated. It has been 
speculated that WD’s ontological thesis generates an incoherence or instability in 
its view of truth of the following basic form: either truth is a property in which 
case ‘is true’ is susceptible to explicit analysis or truth is not a property in which 
case ‘is true’ is not susceptible to explicit analysis.3 For example, Boghossian 
(1990) advances an instability objection to WD along such lines on the basis of 
the conceptual import of the T-schema, while Wright (1992, 1996) advances an 
instability objection to WD along such lines on the basis of the normative import 
of the concept of truth (i.e., on the basis of the fact that truth is a distinct norm 
from justification).  
 Perhaps the most potent variation of the instability objection, though, 
gives rise to a truth-property ascription dilemma that in effect calls into question 
the very coherence of the notion ‘deflated property’. Of course, 
instability/incoherence dilemmas are not entirely new for the notion ‘deflated 
property’. It has been relatively widely speculated that for any property P there 
                                                                                                                                                              
role of ‘true’ as a logical predicate, it is nonetheless a ‘property’, at least in some sense of the 
term” (p. 125). 
3 In the postscript to his (1998a), Horwich attempts to short circuit the instability objection by 
qualifying WD’s (or ‘minimalism’s’) ontological thesis, claiming that WD does not in itself 
answer the question of whether or not truth is a property, but does so only in conjunction with 
particular conceptions of property (p. 141): 
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must, metaphysical speaking, be some basis for ascribing P to any entity E that 
bears it, but that the deflationist about any property P does not have the 
explanatory resources necessary to supply us with the basis for such ascriptions. 
In other words, it has been surmised, contra the deflationist about properties, that 
to supply the metaphysical basis for ascribing a property P to any entity E, P must 
be inflated.     
The instability dilemma for WD fits this general mold. While its details 
need some spelling out (see §3), the instability dilemma for WD can be framed in 
simple terms:  
 
Assuming truth is a property, like other properties, it is attributable to 
entities paradigmatically thought to bear it (propositions, sentences, 
beliefs, etc.). For example, if truth is a property it is attributable to the 
following statements:  
 
(S1) snow is white,  
(S2) grass is green,  
(S3) the earth is round, 
 
and the like. WD, in view of its ontological thesis, is thus subject to the 
following desideratum: its proponent must furnish us with the basis, 
metaphysically speaking, for truth-property ascriptions of this kind. In 
particular, she must answer the following question: what is the basis for 
ascribing the property of truth to all the statements in question? Or to put 
the point another way, what prevents us from ascribing some other 
property to the statements in question, or from ascribing a different 
property to each statement (since each statement has a different truth 
condition)?4  
                                                          
 
Minimalism does not involve, in itself, any particular answer to this question. 
For it may be combined with a variety of different conceptions of property, 
some of which will yield the conclusion that truth predicate does stand for a 
property, and some that it doesn’t. 
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The quagmire is that there appears to be only two basic maneuvers 
available to the proponent of WD in this case, neither of which seems to 
enable her to retain her unique, two-pronged ontological thesis about truth 
― i) that it is a property and ii) that it is deflated. Either 1) she must argue 
that there is no metaphysical basis for the ascription of a property of truth 
to truth bearers (there is nothing that makes them all true) in which case 
she relinquishes thesis i), or 2) she must argue that there is some basis for 
truth-property ascriptions in which case she relinquishes thesis ii).     
 
3 First Horn of the Dilemma 
 
To begin, consider the first (minor) horn of the dilemma. To elude this horn, the 
proponent of WD must argue that there is no metaphysical basis for ascribing 
truth to truth bearers. In other words, what must be argued in this case is that for 
each and every truth-bearer, e.g., [snow is white], [grass is green], etc., there is 
nothing that makes them true, nothing by virtue of which we can ascribe a 
property of truth to them. Such a maneuver is clearly a non-starter, though, one 
that surely will not tempt the proponent of WD. Indisputably, if there is nothing 
that makes alleged truth bearers true by virtue of which we can ascribe a property 
                                                                                                                                                              
On the surface, though, such a maneuver does not appear to confront the heart of the instability 
objection. Horwich’s maneuver, it would seem, can be glossed as follows: depending on what 
conception of property is endorsed, WD implies either i) that truth is a deflated or ‘logical’ 
property or ii) that truth is not a property. The problem is that on i), WD is committed to truth 
being a deflated property of some kind in which case it still gives rise to the instability objection, 
and on ii), WD is committed to there being no property of truth in which case WD looks 
indistinguishable from strong deflationism or the so-called ‘redundancy theory of truth’, a theory 
widely regarded as patently untenable (see Horwich, note 2). 
 
4 In other words, ascribe [snow is white] property A, [grass is green] property B, [the earth is 
round] property C, etc. (where none of A, B, C and the like are the property of truth). 
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of truth to them, entitlement is relinquished for ascribing the property of truth to 
them.  
A cursory examination of property ascriptions bears this point out. The 
following seems to be a standard principle constraining property ascriptions: 
 
(POP) To be justified in ascribing some property P to an entity or set of 
entities E relevant grounds G must be available to license the 
ascription by explaining why or how E possesses P.  
 
It seems uncontroversial, viz. (POP), that property ascriptions require relevancy 
grounds. For example, to be justified in ascribing the property of tallness to Evan 
and Sally one must supply some reason explaining why Evan and Sally are tall, to 
be justified in ascribing the property of heaviness to Rasheed and Joseph one must 
supply some reason explaining why Rasheed and Joseph are heavy, etc.5  
 But assuming the legitimacy of (POP), it plainly is not a maneuver 
available to the proponent of WD to contend that there is no basis for truth-
property ascriptions ― that there is nothing that makes truth-bearers true (by 
virtue of which we can ascribe the property of truth to them). The problem is that 
claiming there is no basis for truth-property ascriptions violates (POP), since by 
failing to furnish the basis for truth-property ascriptions, the proponent of WD 
                                                          
 
5 This seems to follow regardless of which account of the notion property one embraces (i.e., no 
matter what properties are, ontologically speaking) — whether properties are particulars, 
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fails to provide any grounds for ascribing the property of truth to truth-bearers, let 
alone relevant grounds. 
 In short, WD cannot elude the first horn of the truth-property ascription 
dilemma since by claiming there is no metaphysical basis for truth-property 
ascriptions ― nothing that makes alleged truth bearers true ― the proponent of 
WD, assuming the judicious (POP), relinquishes entitlement for ascribing the 
property of truth to any statement or for claiming that any statement is true. The 
implication in this case is that WD’s view of truth collapses into that of strong 
deflationism: i.e., no property is ascribed to statements when we describe them as 
‘being true’ (that is, there is no property of truth).  
 
4 Second Horn of the Dilemma 
 
Next, consider the second (major) horn of the dilemma. To elude this horn, the 
exponent of WD must argue that there is a basis for ascribing a property of truth 
to truth bearers ― there is something that makes truth bearers true that licenses 
the ascription of a property of truth to them.  
Crucially, what requires underscoring at this stage is that there is a widely 
held, intuitively appealing perspective from which it would appear WD will not 
be able to invoke this maneuver either. This perspective can best be appreciated 
by looking more closely at (POP): to be justified in ascribing some property P to 
                                                                                                                                                              
universals, tropes, the meanings of the predicates that designate them, or something else. For more 
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an entity or set of entities E relevant grounds G must be available to license the 
ascription by explaining how or why E bears P. A natural extension of (POP), one 
that the proponent of WD will reject, is (POP*): to be justified in ascribing some 
property P to an entity or set of entities E relevant grounds G must be available to 
license the ascription by explaining why E bears P, where in order for G to 
explain why E bears P, G must refer to one or more sortals (i.e., defining 
characteristics) of E by virtue of which E bears P. (POP*) stipulates, for example, 
that to be justified in ascribing the property of tallness to Evan and Sally one must 
refer to one or more sortals characterizing Evan and Sally by virtue of which the 
property of tallness can be ascribed to them (e.g., they both measure at over six 
feet in height), to be justified in ascribing the property of heaviness to Rasheed 
and Joseph one must refer to one or more sortals characterizing Rasheed and 
Joseph by virtue of which the property of heaviness can be ascribed to them (e.g., 
they both weigh over two hundred pounds).6  
The intuitive plausibility of (POP*) stems from its pre-reflectively appealing 
view of what relevant grounds for property ascriptions must look like. In 
                                                                                                                                                              
on the different theories of properties see Mellor and Oliver’s anthology (1997). 
 
6 Of course, (POP*) does not imply that supplying relevant grounds for ascribing a property to an 
entity or set of entities must involve appealing to a separable property Pii of the entity in question 
in virtue of which the original property Pi is instantiated. Instead, (POP*) implies that the grounds 
licensing the ascription of a property to an entity must refer to sortals individuating the property as 
such, whether such sortals are themselves property constituting or not. The disclaimer renders 
(POP*) at least prima facie plausible by rescuing it from a prompt rebuttal to the effect that if 
property ascriptions must be grounded in the isolation of a separable property of the target of the 
ascription a vicious, infinite regress of ascriptive justification will be generated. (POP*), in 
conformity with this concern, suggests that the regress of ascriptive justification terminates 
eventually in the isolation of sortals by virtue of which the property of truth is instantiated but that 
are not themselves property constituting.  
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particular, (POP*) endorses a supposition about property-ascription justifications 
that is difficult to resist ceteris paribus: i.e., relevant grounds G for ascribing a 
property P to an entity E must explain why or how E bears P. Relevant grounds 
for property ascriptions would seem to need to be explanatorily relevant in some 
sense. It is surmised, though, that the only sorts of grounds G that seem capable of 
explaining why (or how) an entity E bears P must make reference to one or more 
sortal characteristics of E. The crucial point is that it is difficult to fathom what 
might distinguish E as bearing P without recourse to some kind of sortal 
categorization of E, in which E comes out as a subset of P things. At the very 
least, this view of things seems prescribed by ordinary canons of explanation and 
analysis which dictate that only explanations (or analyses) drawing out explicit 
sortal connections between explanans and explanandum can be sufficiently 
illuminating.      
 From the intuitive, (POP*)-based perspective, though, WD’s justifications 
for truth-property ascriptions plainly do not satisfy the explanatory relevancy 
criterion for property ascriptions. In particular, WD cannot justify the ascription 
of the property of truth P to a statement or set of statements S by appealing to 
sortal characteristics of S that explain why S bears P. The problem for WD is that 
it holds that truth is an indefinable and unanalyzable property ― a property whose 
explanatory role is exhausted by its involvement in the schema: [P] is true iff P. 
This means the exponent of WD is forbidden from providing justifications for 
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truth-property ascriptions with the explicit form deemed necessary for 
explanatory illumination: justifications that draw out explicit sortal connections 
between explanans and explanandum. 
 
 5 Second Horn of the Dilemma Revisited 
 
Unquestionably, though, the challenge remains of examining whether the 
intuitive, (POP*)-based perspective obstructing our opponent’s evasion of the 
second horn of our dilemma is in fact a viable one. In particular, to assess the 
legitimacy of this intuitive perspective, it is important to examine WD’s specific 
proposal(s) for grounding truth-property ascriptions to determine whether it 
satisfies uncontroversial requirements for explanatory relevance (e.g., those 
stipulated by (POP)).  
 In my view, only one basic option is available to the advocate of WD in 
this case. This option is pursued in a proposal made by Horwich (1998a, chapter 
7).7 Horwich proposes that the basis for truth-property ascriptions is in effect that 
truth bearers in a specific sense ‘legitimately instantiate the T-schema’ (not the 
standard reading of this phrase): [P] is true iff P. In particular, Horwich claims 
that the license for ascribing the property of truth to a proposition, sentence or 
belief is that it legitimately instantiate the T-schema in the following sense: i) it 
can be plugged into the schema, and ii) the right-hand side of the schema in some 
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sense comes to pass. In other words, the license for ascribing the property of truth 
to [snow is white] derives from the legitimacy of the corresponding T-sentence ― 
[snow is white] is true iff snow is white ― and that snow is white, the license for 
ascribing the property of truth to [grass is green] derives from the corresponding 
T-sentence ― [grass is green is true iff grass is green] ― and that grass is green, 
and so forth.  
 To be sure, this maneuver is a fortiori plausible. It supplies us with the 
only justification for truth-property ascriptions that seems permissible on the 
terms of WD: a statement must legitimately instantiate the T-schema. Upon closer 
examination of the functioning of the T-schema, though, ― how it functions, in 
conjunction with actualities (e.g., that snow is white) to pick out certain kinds of 
statements and not others as true ― it becomes less manifest that the grounds 
supplied by Horwich for truth-property ascriptions satisfy uncontroversial criteria 
for explanatory relevancy (stipulated by (POP)).    
A potential concern with Horwich’s maneuver in this case is that any 
explanation of the T-schema, how it functions to only pick out true propositions, 
must amplify the material equivalence of the ‘[P]’ and ‘P’ upon which our 
understanding of the T-schema is founded, if it is to be minimally comprehensible 
and thus satisfy an indisputable relevancy requirement (stipulated by (POP)). For 
example, consider one such explanation of the T-schema:  
 
                                                                                                                                                              
7 Horwich’s explicit formulation of the proposal differs somewhat from that given in the text. But 
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(TS) A statement is true (i.e., legitimately instantiates the T-schema) if and only 
if what it says to be the case is in fact the case (compare with Boghossian, 
1990).  
 
To be sure, there are other ways of explaining the T-schema, but if I am correct an 
explanation of this general form will be needed: an explanation deploying 
semantic notions or phrases such as ‘saying what is the case’, ‘expressing what is 
the case’, ‘facts’, and so forth. The problem with any such explanation, of course, 
is that it incurs ontological commitments forbidden by WD, since it says things 
about truth its advocate is not permitted to say (given her ontological thesis),8 
things that would seem to commit her to truth being a property with an underlying 
nature (i.e., some sort of correspondence between statements and facts). Patently, 
to analyze truth (or derivatively truth-bearing) via the deployment of semantic 
explanans is to commit oneself to an inflationary view of truth. 
Not surprisingly, Horwich has a reply to this kind of objection to his 
proposal for justifying truth-property ascriptions (1998a, pp. 34-35 and 50-51): 
the notion of legitimately instantiating the T-schema does not require 
amplification since the T-schema is explanatorily basic or primitive. In addition to 
Horwich, Soames (1999, p. 231) also endorses some such form of the so-called 
‘primitivist thesis’ regarding the T-schema.  
                                                                                                                                                              
Horwich’s basic line of reasoning is captured by our formulation of the proposal.  
 
8 Refer back to section 1. 
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The question is: what might be meant by the claim that the T-schema that 
truth bearers must legitimately instantiate is explanatorily basic? The primitivist 
thesis is difficult to pin down but is typically fleshed out in the following way 
(Horwich (1998a, pp. 50-1, 121) and (1998b)): the T-schema is explanatorily 
basic in the sense that the need to explain its functioning does not arise. The 
interpretation of the T-schema, according to this line of argument, is not a thing it 
is possible to explain inasmuch as it is already implicitly fixed by our dispositions 
to assent to its instantiations.9 
If the interpretation of the T-schema is implicitly fixed by our dispositions 
to assent to its instantiations, the obligation to explicitly explain it, i.e., by 
importing inflationary semantic notions or phrases such as ‘saying something to 
be the case’, ‘expressing the fact that’, etc. will be discharged. The snafu is that 
the Horwichian dispositionalist defense of the primitivist thesis about the T-
schema flies wide of the mark: dispositions to assent to the instances of the T-
schema seem not to implicitly fix its meaning. Apparently, there are a wide 
variety of questions regarding how any version of the T-schema (e.g., the 
disquotational schema, the equivalence schema, etc.) is to be read that are not 
resolvable by appeal to dispositional assent.  
                                                          
 
9 And in effect, according to this line of argument, such dispositions fix the meaning of the word 
‘true’. This is the sense in which, for Horwich, the dispositions to assent to the instances of the T-
schema (in his case, the equivalence schema) are supposed to be truth constituting (1998a, pp. 34-
35). Many of the background assumptions underlying this line of argument can be found in 
Horwich’s (1998b). Soames does not make this sort of claim in defense of the explanatory 
primitiveness of the T-schema. But since neither Soames nor any other proponent of WD provides 
an alternative defense of the primitivist thesis, we can restrict our examination to Horwich’s 
dispositionalist defense. 
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Consider Horwich’s version of the T-schema, the equivalence schema:  
 
(ES) <P> is true iff P (where ‘<P>’ stands for ‘the proposition that P’ and ‘P’ 
 stands for <P>’s object-level equivalent).  
 
Instances of this schema include 
 
(ESI) the proposition that snow is white is true iff snow is white,  
(ESI) the proposition that grass is green is true iff grass is green, 
 
and the like. As it has recently been argued (e.g., Collins (2002, pp. 668-674), 
Davidson (1990) and Wiggins (1980)), one crucial aspect of how to read the 
equivalence schema (and its various instances) that is not fixed by our disposition 
to assent to propositions such as these is how to read the ‘iff’ operator in it. There 
are a variety of ways in which the ‘iff’ operator might be read in the equivalence 
schema (or in any version of the T-schema). Does it represent extensional 
equivalence, intensional equivalence, cognitive equivalence, etc.?10 Dispositions 
to assent to the instances of the equivalence schema are of no help at all here in 
isolating which of these readings is the correct one. Indeed, our disposition to 
assent to the instances of the equivalence schema seems at least partly to be a 
function of how the ‘iff’ operator is to be interpreted, implying a fortiori they 
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cannot be constitutive of its interpretation. For example, if the ‘iff’ operator in the 
equivalence schema only represents extensional equivalence, we will be more 
disposed to assent to the propositions that instantiate it. If, on the other hand, ‘iff’ 
represents cognitive equivalence (a stronger relation), we will be less disposed to 
assent to the propositions that instantiate the equivalence schema. In short, bare 
dispositional assent does not implicitly fix the meaning of the equivalence schema 
in view of the widely acknowledged fact that there are crucial aspects of its 
interpretation that bare dispositions tell us nothing about such as the question of 
how the ‘iff’ operator is to be read in it.11 The same point applies mutatis 
mutandis to any other version of the T-schema.  
Perhaps, then, since bare dispositions will not suffice to fix the meaning of the 
T-schema, the dispositionalist might appeal to patterns of sets of dispositions to 
assent to the instances of the T-schema to fix its meaning (e.g., to distinguish 
between different readings of the ‘iff’ operator). One question this proposal raises 
is: what are ‘patterns of sets of dispositions’? Presumably, they are sets of 
dispositions with structural relations to one another. The crucial difficulty with 
such a proposal is that patterns of sets of dispositions (or dispositions with 
structural relations to one another) is plainly not a natural kind: mere dispositions 
do not stand in explanatory or structural relations to one another. Indeed, as 
                                                                                                                                                              
10 There is no standard reading of ‘iff’ the proponent of WD can appeal to in this connection.  
 
11 Aside from questions concerning the proper interpretation of the equivalence schema, another 
important question the Horwichian dispositionalist defense of the primitivist thesis leaves open is 
why we should have dispositions to assent to true statements and not false statements, or 
statements bearing some other kind of property. 
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Collins has pointed out (2002, pp. 672-3), the only way to discern the structural 
relations between sets of dispositions is to appeal to an underlying theory of 
semantic competence ― a theory of what it is to competently speak and 
understand a language. Plainly, though, in this case the theory of semantic 
competence would be doing the explanatory work. 
In short, the problem is that the only proposal available to the defender of WD 
that I am aware of (and the only proposal on the table) involves justifying truth-
property ascriptions via Horwich’s criterion of legitimately instantiating the T-
schema, and then claiming that the T-schema does not need to be explained (to 
satisfy the relevancy requirement) since it is in some sense explanatorily 
primitive. But it would seem that no version of the T-schema can be explanatorily 
primitive in the way this line of argument requires: its interpretation is not 
implicitly fixed by dispositional assent (either bare dispositional assent or patterns 
of sets of dispositional assent). The implication is that WD seems unable to 
forestall the requirement of explicitly explaining how the T-schema functions, in 
conjunction with actualities, to discriminate between true and false statements, 
and that it needs to invoke inflationary semantic notions to do so.  
Sustained reflection thus bears out our intuitive supposition that the defender 
of WD seems unable elude the second horn of the dilemma: she cannot furnish us 
with a justification for truth-property ascriptions that satisfies basic relevancy 
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requirements without recourse to inflationary explanans. The implication in this 
case is that WD’s view of truth collapses into some form of inflationism. 
 
6 Conclusion 
 
In the end, then, WD is on shaky ground: it appears to be fundamentally unstable. 
The problem is that WD’s ontological thesis about truth  that it is both a 
property and deflated  generates a troublesome truth-property ascription 
dilemma the proponent of WD is at pains to circumvent. In attempting to elude 
the first horn of the dilemma, WD’s view of truth collapses into that of strong 
deflationism. In attempting to elude the second horn of the dilemma, WD’s view 
of truth collapses into that of some form of inflationism.  
Importantly, the deficiency in WD’s ontological thesis seems to issue from 
its failure to conform to a view regarding the nature of property-ascription 
justifications that is difficult to dismiss. Intuition and sustained analysis seem to 
bear out that the justification of property ascriptions are governed by (POP) and 
its natural extension (POP*): to be justified in ascribing some property P to an 
entity or set of entities E relevant grounds G must be available to license the 
ascription by explaining why E bears P, where in order for G to explain why E 
bears P, G must make reference to one or more sortals of E (by virtue of which E 
bears P). (POP*)’s legitimacy implies the folly of taking the ontological middle 
road when it comes to alethic theorizing ― of claiming that truth is both a 
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property and deflated. More generally, though, (POP*)’s legitimacy implies the 
folly of taking the ontological middle road when it comes to theorizing about 
properties in general (of claiming that anything can both be a property and 
deflated), and for this reason, has enormous bearing on the prospects for 
deflationary metaphysical positions. 
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